在认证加密方向,密码学院王鹏副教授担任通讯作者的论文《Breaking and Fixing Spoed》近期被 Inscrypt 2026(International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology)接收。
这一成果不仅系统揭示了Spoed从内部反馈机制到形式化安全证明的深层漏洞,实现了对认证加密方案完整性与机密性的双重突破,还形成了从高效攻击构造、错误证明定位到安全方案修复的完整研究链条,为基于压缩函数的认证加密方案设计和安全证明方法的可靠性评估提供了重要参考,也对实际密码系统中结构性漏洞的发现与修复具有指导意义。
Inscrypt 2026于2026年11月7日至11月9日在中国香港举办。学生贾燕代表研究团队以线上方式参加会议,并在大会上作了学术报告。
Abstract:Spoed is an authenticated encryption scheme based on compression functions. We show that Spoed fails to achieve its claimed security guarantees with respect to both integrity and confidentiality. In particular, we present a universal forgery attack that succeeds with probability one using only a single encryption query and a single decryption query. The attack exploits a structural weakness in the feedback mechanism of Spoed, allowing internal inputs of the underlying pseudorandom function to coincide during verification. We further show that the same weakness enables efficient plaintext-recovery attacks, permitting recovery of almost the entire plaintext with at most two decryption queries, depending on the associated-data length. We explain why the original security proof of Spoed fails, and identify the mismatch between the collision events used in the H-coefficient analysis and the scheme’s actual behavior. Finally, we propose a minimally modified variant, fSpoed, and prove that it achieves the originally claimed security bounds under standard assumptions.
论文信息:Yan Jia, Peng Wang, Lei Hu, Gang Liu, Tingting Guo, and Shuping Mao. 2027. Breaking and Fixing Spoed. In Information Security and Cryptology, 2027. Springer Nature, Singapore, 64–84. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-92-7675-2_4