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密码学院在研学生张世聪论文被 Inscrypt 2026 接收

  • 图文/密码学院
  • 日期:2026-11-16
  • 26

近日,密码学院在研学生张世聪作为第一作者撰写的论文《Binding Properties and Robust Entity Authentication: A Systematic Formal Analysis of ISO/IEC 9798-3》被Inscrypt2026(International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology)接收。

这一成果将实体鉴别的安全分析从“签名的不可伪造性”进一步细化到“签名究竟能绑定什么”,为理解密码原语的安全性质如何影响协议整体安全提供了系统依据。

Inscrypt 2026于2026年11月7日至11月9日在中国香港举办。张世聪代表研究团队参加会议,并在大会上作学术报告,介绍该项研究成果。

Abstract:Digital-signature-based entity-authentication protocols, such as those standardized in ISO/IEC 9798-3, are typically analyzed under the assumption that existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA) is the main primitive assumption needed for entity authentication. EUF-CMA, however, leaves open whether a verified signature uniquely determines its payload or its verifying key, and this ambiguity can undermine authentication even when no forgery occurs. We formalize three binding properties of the verification relation (SP-M, SM-P, and S-MP) and three corresponding protocol-level goals (EA-NIA, EA-MR, EA-KR) under honest, key-leakage, and malicious-registration adversaries. Using symbolic models in Tamarin, we analyze all ten ISO/IEC 9798-3 mechanisms and identify inclusion-minimal sufficient binding assumptions at each commit point. Our results reveal a structural separation: under malicious registration, message-context robustness requires all three binding properties across all ten mechanisms. This uniformity is a structural consequence of the standard’s design, which leaves payload uniqueness entirely to the signature primitive. Key-attribution robustness admits smaller sufficient sets for TTP-based mechanisms (6–10), exposing a previously unidentified design boundary. When any required property is weakened, we derive explicit counterexample traces showing message migration or key substitution attacks. We map these requirements to deployed signature schemes and show that generic strengthening such as the BUFF transform can close the gap under its assumptions without modifying the protocol flow.

论文信息:Shicong Zhang, Peng Wang. Binding Properties and Robust Entity Authentication: A Systematic Formal Analysis of ISO/IEC 9798-3. In: Au, M.H., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2026. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 17228. Springer, Singapore.